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1. Introduction 
There are three main means-tested social security benefits for pensioners in the UK.
The Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG), formerly Income Support (IS), provides 
general income maintenance.  Housing Benefit (HB) provides assistance with meeting 
rents.  Council Tax Benefit (CTB) reduces recipients’ liabilities for the local Council 
Tax.  In fiscal year 2000/01, 34% of all pensioners and 44% of single pensioners 
received some means-tested state benefit (Department for Work and Pensions, 2002).  
The scope of means-tested benefits will be increased further from October 2003 when 
the MIG will be subsumed within a new means-tested benefit for pensioners, the 
Pension Credit.  Around one half of all pensioners are expected to be entitled to 
Pension Credit (Department for Work and Pensions, 2001). 
Despite the high coverage of means-tested pensioner benefits, they suffer from 
a significant degree of non take-up.  Official estimates are that in 2000/01 28% of 
pensioners who appeared to be entitled to IS did not receive it.  Corresponding 
proportions for CTB and HB are 35% and 10% respectively.  HB thus appears to 
achieve higher take-up than the other two benefits.  For all three benefits, the 
proportion of those not claiming their entitlements is higher than the proportion of 
total entitlement which is unclaimed, indicating that take-up is related positively to 
the size of entitlements.  In 2000/01 the unclaimed proportions of IS, CTB and HB are 
estimated as 21%, 31% and 7% respectively (Department for Work and Pensions, 
2003).
Government statistics on benefit take-up do not analyse the extent of overlap 
between entitlement or take-up of different benefits.  Here we provide such an 
analysis to gain a more complete picture of take-up and aid understanding of take-up.
The paper uses data from the British Family Resources Survey spanning the period 
April 1997 to March 2000.  We examine the extent to which pensioners claim all, 
some, or none of any entitlements to means-tested benefits, analyse the distribution of 
proportionate additions to income foregone by non claimants and relate take-up of IS, 
HB and CTB to the marginal benefit from claiming.  We discuss what the results 
suggest about the factors underlying non-take-up, such as poor information about 
eligibility for the different benefits and the social stigma that may be associated with 
benefit claiming and dependence.  Section 2 provides a brief overview of the British 
system of state benefits for pensioners.  In Section 3 we explain how data from the 2
Family Resources Survey are used to simulate benefit entitlement and calculate take-
up by pensioners.  Sections 4 and 5 consider respectively combined take-up rates for 
the three benefits and measurement of take-up in a multi-benefit system.  The 
economics of take-up and the relationship between take-up of combinations of benefit 
and the marginal gain from claiming is analysed in Section 6.  Section 7 concludes. 
2.  State benefits for pensioners in Britain 
In the UK, the state pays three main types of benefits to pensioners: the flat-rate basic 
state pension, an earnings-related state pension and means-tested benefits.  There are 
also disability-related benefits which are not means-tested.   
State pensions 
Most pensioners are entitled to the basic state pension earned through paying National 
Insurance (NI) contributions during their working lives.  At £77.45 a week, a full 
basic state pension is currently worth 17% of average gross earnings of full-time 
employees.  Pensioners with partial NI contribution records are entitled to a basic 
state pension at less than this rate.  The state earnings related pension scheme 
(SERPS) was introduced in 1978.  Pensioners retiring in 1998/9 were the first cohort 
who could have earned maximum SERPS pensions, currently equivalent to about 30% 
of average earnings (Pensions Policy Institute, 2003).  However, latest figures show 
that the average total state pension in payment in September 2001 was only 
marginally above the full basic state pension rate (Department for Work and Pensions, 
2002a).
Entitlements to SERPS depend on NI contributions and past earnings.  It is 
possible to opt out of SERPS and contribute to a private pension instead.  SERPS was 
replaced with the State Second Pension in April 2002 but the incomes of current 
pensioners are not affected by this change.
Means-tested benefits for pensioners 
Although the state retirement pension is payable to individuals, means-tested benefits 
(IS, HB and CTB) are assessed and paid to pensioner units – single pensioners or 
pensioner couples.
Entitlement to IS is zero if the pensioner unit’s capital holdings are above an 
upper threshold (£8,000 during the period in question).  Otherwise it is the difference, 
if positive, between needs or ‘prescribed amounts’ (which depend on age, disability 3
and whether single or living with a partner) and means or ‘assessable income’ (which 
is a function of the pensioner unit’s income and capital).  Certain kinds of income, 
such as disability benefits, are excluded in part or in full from assessable income.  
Actual income from capital is also excluded.  Instead a notional income from capital 
between a lower threshold (£3,000 during our data period) and the upper threshold is 
assumed at the rate of £1 a week for each £250 or part of £250 of capital between the 
two limits.  For example, someone with capital of £6,000 is deemed to have an 
income from it of £12 a week ((£6,000 - £3,000)/250).   
HB and CTB also depend on prescribed amounts and assessable income.  
Prescribed amounts are calculated in the same way as for IS.  However, the upper 
capital threshold is higher (£16,000) for HB and CTB than for IS.  Assessable income 
therefore includes notional income, calculated as for IS, on capital between £3,000 
and £16,000.  Pensioners with assessable income at or below their needs are entitled 
to maximum HB, if they pay rent and/or to maximum CTB if they are liable for 
council tax.  Pensioners entitled to IS are therefore automatically entitled to maximum 
HB and/or CTB.  Subject to restrictions on what counts as eligible rent and council 
tax, maximum entitlements to HB and CTB cover 100% of these costs.  Where 
assessable income exceeds the prescribed amount, entitlements to HB and CTB are 
reduced by 65% (HB) and 20% (CTB) of the excess of assessable income over 
prescribed amounts. 
The main benefit rates prevailing during the period under study are set out in 
appendix Table A1.  These show that single pensioners with state retirement pensions 
of no more than the basic state pension are necessarily entitled to means-tested 
benefits unless they have other income or have capital above the relevant upper 
threshold.
3.  Simulating benefit entitlement and take-up using the Family Resources 
Survey
The FRS is a continuous cross-sectional survey of British households carried out on 
behalf of the Department for Work and Pensions.  All adult respondents are asked 
whether they receive each of a comprehensive set of social security benefits and if so, 
the amount they last received.  Details of private sources of income, capital holdings, 
rent and council tax liabilities, personal and other characteristics relevant to 
calculating entitlement to means-tested benefits are also recorded.  The survey can 4
therefore be used to assess each pensioner unit’s entitlement to IS, CTB and HB, 
compare that with their recorded receipts of these benefits, and examine patterns of 
non take-up.  However, any errors in recorded income (including state benefits), 
capital, rent or council tax liabilities will lead to errors in assessed entitlement.  The 
data used here have been subjected to an extensive error detection and correction 
procedure to minimise the potential for such errors (Hancock and Barker 2002)
2.
The analysis in this paper is based on data from three years of FRS spanning the 
period April 1997 to March 2000. The pensioner rates of IS, CTB and HB apply to 
single people aged 60 years or more or couples where either partner is aged at least 
60.  However, the sample used here was restricted to households containing only a 
single pensioner aged at least five years above state pension aged (i.e. men aged 70+ 
and women aged 65+) or a couple where both partners were five or more years over 
state pension age.  Those in receipt of income from employment and self-employment 
or still re-paying a mortgage were also excluded, resulting in an initial sample of 
12,801.  These restrictions mean that we concentrate on pensioners whose incomes 
are likely to be relatively stable and minimise the scope for measurement error which 
could lead us to assess benefit entitlement incorrectly.  The focus on older pensioners 
is justified in terms of policy relevance since older pensioners are poorer than younger 
pensioners and so more likely to be entitled to means-tested benefits (Curry and 
O’Connell, 2003).  Further cases were excluded where, after detecting and correcting 
errors in their recorded benefit receipt, their data were not sufficiently complete or 
reliable to make an assessment of their benefit entitlements.  Additional details of how 
the sample was restricted are given in the appendix.  The final sample used in the 
analysis consisted of 9,449 pensioner units, or 74% of the initial sample of 12,801.  
Of the 9,449 cases, 4,539 where calculated to be entitled to at least one means-tested 
benefit.
2  Hancock and Barker (2002) describe the process as applied to income and capital.  Amongst other 
things, this involved reversing DWP imputations and excluding observations with missing values 
where there was no clear basis for a case-specific imputation.  For this paper, recorded amounts of rent, 
council tax, HB and CTB were treated similarly. 5
4.  Take-up rates and unclaimed entitlements 
Take-up rates for individual benefits 
Table 1 shows take-up rates within our sample for individual benefits in a similar 
format to Government estimates.  The percentage of those entitled who claim benefit 
is highest (90%) for HB.  The take-up rate for CTB is 74% and for IS it is only 66%.  
Mean unclaimed entitlements are smaller than claimed entitlements, so that take-up of 
total entitlements is higher than the proportion of entitled people who claim their 
entitlements.  The figures in Table 1 can also be used to show that unclaimed IS 
accounts for nearly half (48%) of total unclaimed benefit with unclaimed HB and 
CTB each accounting for about a quarter. 
Table 1: Individual benefit take-up rates, claimed and unclaimed 
entitlements to Income Support, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit 
 Entitled  to 
 IS  HB  CTB 
Proportion of those entitled who receive benefit  66%  90%  76% 
mean claimed entitlement (£s pw)  21.80  37.70  7.50 
mean unclaimed entitlement (£s pw)  15.30  21.70  5.40 
proportion of total entitlement claimed  74%  94%  82% 
Sample size  2,052  2,677  4,327 
Multiple benefit entitlements 
Many of those entitled to one of the three means-tested benefit, are also entitled to at 
least one other benefit (Figure 1 and Table 2). The most frequent combination is 
entitlement to all three benefits, followed closely by entitlement to CTB only or to 
CTB and HB.  All pensioners entitled to IS are, by definition, entitled to HB and CTB 
unless they do not pay rent or council tax. In our sample, 64% of pensioners entitled 
to IS are entitled to all three benefits and 33% (non renters) to IS and CTB.  Most 
pensioners entitled to HB are entitled to all three benefits (50%) or to HB and CTB 
(43%).  It is more common to be not entitled to other benefits if entitled to CTB 
(27%) than if entitled to IS (1%) or to HB (6%).  Nonetheless, nearly three-quarters of 
pensioners entitled to CTB are also entitled to HB or IS or both. 6
Table 2: Proportion entitled to individual benefits who are entitled to other benefits
 Entitled  to 
 IS  HB  CTB 
Entitled to only IS/HB/CTB  1%  6%  27% 
Entitled to IS and HB  1%  1%  n.a. 
Entitled to IS and CTB  33%  n.a.  16% 
Entitled to HB and CTB  n.a.  43%  27% 
Entitled to IS, HB and CTB  64%  50%  31% 
Sample size  2,052  2,677  4,327 
Figure 1:  Combined benefit entitlements 
Multiple benefit receipt 
Table 3 shows what proportion of those entitled to each of the three benefits are 
recorded as receiving each benefit.  Although a third of pensioners in our sample are 
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3.  In contrast most of those not taking up their entitlements to CTB 
or HB are not receiving any of the three benefits. 
Table 3: Proportions entitled to and receiving individual benefits
 Entitled  to 
 IS  HB  CTB 
 column  % 
Receiving      
  benefit in question, with/without other benefits  66  90  76 
 other  benefit(s)  only  24  2  2 
 none    10  8  22 
Sample size  2,052  2,677  4,327 
Combined take-up rates are shown in Table 4.  The percentages presented in the 
diagonal of the table are compete take-up rates, that is the proportions taking up 
everything to which they are entitled.  Complete take-up is highest at 84% for those 
entitled to HB and CTB but not IS.  It is lowest (44%) among those entitled only to 
CTB.
Table 4: Combined take-up rates: Income Support, Housing Benefit and 
Council Tax Benefit


















none  (55)  43  56 3  (0) 24 10 63 
IS only  (45)     * (4)  2   * 
HB only    57  1 (21)   4  2 
CTB only      44 1  25  2  8 
IS+HB+ CTB        73    1 0  
IS+HB      * (75)    *  
IS+CTB      1  49  4 
HB+CTB      22    85 13
All  cases  100 100  100 100  100 100 100 100 
Sample  size  20 164  1,168  1,331  28 673  1,154  9,449 
( ) indicates small sample size.  * less than 0.5
3 Cases receiving HB and/or CTB but not taking up entitlements to IS were examined closely for 
evidence that they were incorrectly calculated to be entitled to IS due to measurement error in their 
income or capital.  65% of such cases were receiving maximum HB and/or CTB which is consistent 
with income and capital low enough to qualify for IS.  The remainder were receiving less than 
maximum HB and CTB.  This could result from measurement error in income or capital which would 
indicate that they might not be entitled to IS.  Alternatively it could be the consequence of 
measurement error in rent or council tax, which would not in itself shed doubt on their entitlement to 
IS.8
5.  Measuring take-up rates in a multiple benefit system 
It is often argued that, in contrast with benefits which are not dependent on income or 
capital, means-tested benefits are an efficient way of targeting public resources on 
those in most need.  In their recent pensions report, the UK House of Commons Work 
and Pensions Select Committee concluded ‘…… there is nothing inherently wrong 
with a means-tested approach which focuses available resources on the poorest 
pensioners if the issue of take-up is adequately addressed (House of Commons Work 
and Pensions Committee, 2003, paragraph 63).  The analysis in the preceding section 
suggests that where there is more than one benefit to which people may be entitled 
and claims of partial entitlements are not uncommon, take-up rates for individual 
benefits are inappropriate measures of the effectiveness of the means-tested benefit 
system in reaching those in most need.  Addressing ‘the issue of take-up’ involves 
something different from simply maximising individual benefit take-up rates.
Table 5 shows, for different groups of pensioners, what proportions claim all, 
some or none of their entitlements and the average proportionate increase in income 
that those who fail to claim some benefit are foregoing.  For this purpose income 
includes claimed but not unclaimed entitlements to IS, HB and CTB and is 
constructed as IS assessable income, plus income which is disregarded in assessing IS 
(including investment income, Attendance Allowance and Disability Living 
Allowance), plus total claimed benefit entitlements less rent and council tax.  
Examining take-up by housing tenure shows that complete take-up is highest among 
those renting from local authorities and housing associations: 78% claim all the 
benefits to which they are entitled and only 8% claim none.  The lowest take-up rates 
are among owner-occupiers where equal proportions (45%) claim all the benefits to 
which they are entitled and claim none of them
4.  However, at 41%, the average 
increase in income which non-claiming local authority and housing association 
tenants would achieve by claiming all their entitlements is much higher than that for 
owner-occupiers where it is only 13%.  It is highest of all (88%) among non claiming 
private renters, although the sample size here is small and so this estimate is subject to  
a wide margin of error.  Within pensioner type, the proportion claiming their full 
4 Since owner-occupiers are not eligible for HB, they are more likely than renters to be entitled to only 
one benefit, that being CTB. 9
entitlement is lowest (54%) among single men aged 80 and over but it is non-claiming 
women aged 80+ who lose the largest amounts (40% of income on average) from 
incomplete take-up.  Analysing by pensioner type, complete take-up is highest (69%) 
among single women aged under 80, but non claimants in this group are failing to 
claim amounts which on average would represent nearly a quarter of their income.  
Couples where the head is aged under 80 have an intermediate rate of complete take-
up (60%) but those amongst them who fail to claim some benefit are losing out on an 
average of only 10% of their income. 
Table 5: Take-up of total entitlements by housing tenure and by pensioner type: 
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Housing  tenure           
Renting from Local 
Authority/Housing 
Association   78  15  8  2,432  41.1  547 
Renting from a private 
landlord   71 15  14 237  87.9 69 
 Owner-occupier  45  10  45  1,705  12.8  931 
 Other  50  9  41  127  12.7  64 
Pensioner type             
  Couple, head aged < 80  60  6  34  682  10.2  271 
  Couple, head aged 80+  58  13  29  293  14.8  122 
  Single man aged < 80  66  12  22  450  32.6  152 
  Single man aged 80+  54  22  24  280  29.5  129 
  Single woman aged < 80  69  11  20  1,861  23.8  583 
  Single woman aged 80+  62  18  20  935  39.7  354 
All entitled to at least one 
benefit 64  13  23  4,501  25.6  1,611 
Average % of income 
foregone by non claimants -  28.0 21.2      
Sample size  2,890  567  1,044       
Income is IS assessable income, plus income which is disregarded in assessing IS (including 
investment income, Attendance Allowance and Disability Living Allowance), plus claimed 
entitlements to IS, HB and CTB less rent and council tax.  There are some cases for whom benefit 
entitlement can be assessed but components of this income construct are missing so that sample sizes 
differ from previous tables. 
Rather than just monitoring take-up rates for individual benefits, an alternative 
measure of non take-up might be the proportion of pensioners failing to claim 10
entitlements which would increase their incomes by substantial amounts.  Figures 2 to 
4 plot the distributions of percentages by which incomes would rise if all entitlements 
were claimed, for different groups of pensioners.  Figure 2 indicates that although 
36% are failing to claim some benefit entitlement, the proportions for whom complete 
take-up would add more than 5% and 10% of income are only 22% and 16% 
respectively.  Less than 10% are failing to claim amounts worth more than 20% of 
income.  The distributions of potential additions to income are quite similar for those 
taking-up some and taking-up none of their entitlements.  Comparisons by housing 
tenure (figure 3) reveal that although complete take-up is lowest for owner-occupiers, 
the largest proportionate additions to income are for private tenants followed by local 
authority and housing association tenants. Within pensioner types (figure 4), single 
men and women aged 80+ have high rates of incomplete take-up and are failing to 
claim relatively large additions to their incomes.  Couples where the head is aged 
under 80 also have a high rate of incomplete take-up (40%) but relatively few would 
increase their incomes much by claiming their entitlements.   
6.  The economics of benefit take-up: patterns of take-up and the marginal 
gains from claiming 
Economists start from the view that if an action (take-up) leads to some gain and if 
there are no tangible or intangible costs associated with it, then that action will always 
be taken. A corollary of this is that, if a potentially beneficial action is observed not to 
be taken, then there must exist some offsetting hidden costs outweighing the potential 
benefit. In the case of benefit take-up, there are many possible sources of such costs 
(Ritchie, 1988; Costigan et. al., 1999). Tangible costs include the money and time that 
may be required by the benefit claim procedure. Intangible costs include: the fear of 
penalty for error; the unpleasantness of the claim process; lack of information giving 
rise to information search costs; perceived loss of self-respect; and social stigma 
associated with benefit dependence. The probability of take-up can be expected to rise 
with entitlement, provided claim costs are more or less constant. 
  There is a large econometric literature on take-up behaviour, almost all of it 
dealing with the take-up of a single type of benefit (see Hosek, 1980; Altmann, 1981; 
Moffitt, 1983; Fry and Stark, 1987, 1993; Blundell et. al., 1988; Duclos, 1995; Kim 
and Mergoupis, 1997; Riphahn, 2001; Pudney et. al., 2002). There has been much less 
analysis of the complex problems raised by multi-element benefit systems, but see 11
Fraker and Moffitt, 1988; Keane and Moffitt, 1998; Hernandez and Pudney, 2003. 
Econometric analyses of take-up generate a common strong finding: that the 
probability of take-up is significantly positively related to the amount of entitlement. 
This gives considerable support to the economic view of take-up behaviour, that 
emphasises the role of potential gains. 
  Figure 5 depicts the marginal incentives faced by pensioners in this multi-
benefit world, by giving take-up rates for each of the three benefits among groups of 
pensioners classified by the other benefits they are receiving. The horizontal axis, 
measuring mean entitlement to the benefit in question, represents the marginal 
incentive for take-up: it is the additional income that would be generated by extending 
one’s claim from the benefits already received to include also the benefit in question. 
For example, the point in Figure 5 labelled {IS|HB,CTB,n=1,261} indicates that there 
are 1,261 FRS respondents who were entitled to IS, and were also receiving payments 
of HB and CTB. Among this group, the marginal benefit of extending the claim from 
HB and CTB to include IS would be £20.45 per week on average. In the sample 
77.2% of these respondents did indeed claim IS.
5
The scatter of points in Figure 5 is broadly consistent with the general finding of a 
positive relationship between take-up and entitlement, indicating response to 
incentives. However, CTB is something of an outlier, since take-up is high relative to 
HB and IS despite the typically small CTB entitlement. There are four distinct groups 
of points in Figure 5. Those marked with the symbol Ƒ refer to take-up of individual 
benefits by people receiving no other benefit income. These take-up rates are low 
(ranging from 10-40%) for two reasons. Firstly, people with a general reluctance or 
inability to claim benefits of any kind will tend to be in these groups, thus lowering 
average take-up rates. Secondly, there is a tendency for the ‘escalation’ of claims 
from one benefit to another. The process of claiming one benefit will often generate 
information on and opportunities to claim further benefits, so one would expect 
receipt of one benefit to raise the claim rates for others. 
Points marked with the symbols ż and ǻ refer respectively to take-up of CTB and 
HB among those who are entitled and who are also receiving some other benefit. 
5 Note that these groups are not disjoint. For example, some of the individuals in the group 
{IS|CTB;n=522} will also appear as non-take-up cases in the groups {HB|IS,CTB} and {HB|CTB}. 12
Among these groups, take-up is close to perfect.
6 In contrast, the group marked with 
the symbol , representing those who are entitled to IS and also receiving some other 
benefit, have a significantly lower claim rate. Despite existing contact with the benefit 
system and reasonably high average IS entitlement, the take-up rate lies between 60% 
and 80%.  There are two obvious explanations for the difference between IS and 
HB/CTB.  One explanation involves the nature of the claims process.  Making an IS 
claim can be expected to lead to a claim for HB and CTB, since the application forms 
are issued together and those entitled to IS are by definition entitled to HB/CTB if 
they pay rent/council tax.  The reverse is not always true.  A second possible 
explanation of the difference between IS and HB/CTB take-up is that IS carries 
negative associations, such as social stigma, which do not exist for the two housing-
related benefits. Income supplements like IS/MIG are sometimes perceived as state 
‘handouts’, while HB and CTB are seen more positively as a reduction in a charge for 
housing.
7. Conclusions 
This paper has examined take-up of multiple means-tested benefits by older 
pensioners, yielding a fuller picture of take-up patterns than is provided by analyses of 
take-up for individual benefits.  A number of findings stand out.  Considering benefits 
in isolation from one another, IS has the lowest take-up rate (66%).  However, 90% of 
pensioners in our sample who are entitled to IS claim at least one of IS, HB or CTB.  
Complete take-up is highest (85%) amongst those entitled to HB and CTB but not IS, 
and lowest (44%) for pensioners entitled to CTB only.  Within housing tenure, 
pensioners renting from local authorities or housing associations have the highest 
rates of complete take-up ( 78%) and owner-occupiers the lowest (45%).  But non 
claiming local authority and housing association tenants are foregoing income 
supplements averaging of 41% of their incomes compared with just 13% for owner-
occupiers.  Among different age and marital status groups, single men aged 80+ have 
the lowest complete take-up rates (54%) and non claimants among this group lose out 
on average 30% of their income.  Single women aged 80+ have higher complete take-
up rates (62%) but non claimants among them are failing to claim additions to their 
incomes of 40% on average.   
6 The HB|IS group has a lower take-up rate, but is numerically negligible. 13
  Although 36% of all pensioners in our sample are failing to claim some 
means-tested benefit entitlement, as a percentage of all of them, only 16% could 
increase their incomes by more than 10% by claiming all their entitlements.  Analyses 
of the distribution of proportions by which non claimants’ incomes would rise if they 
claimed all their entitlements, provide a better picture than individual benefit take-up 
rates, of the effectiveness of means-tested benefits in reaching pensioners in most 
need.
  In general take-up is high where entitlement is high.  But there are exceptions 
to this which may reflect the claims process and/or a greater degree of social stigma 
associated with IS than with HB or CTB.  In the case of the former, there would seem 
to be a strong argument for a claims process in which a claim for one means-tested 
benefit automatically triggers assessment of entitlement to other benefits.  On the 
latter, this issue of the ‘image’ of different benefits is of crucial importance for 
Pension Credit, which will subsume the MIG from October 2003.  In calculating 
entitlement to the Pension Credit,  60% of most forms of private income will be 
disregarded.  The Government is presented this as a reward for thrift rather than as a 
reduction in the rate at which entitlement is withdrawn as private income rises.  It is 
hard to predict how successful this ‘rebranding’ will prove to be. 
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APPENDIX 
Derivation of the sample used in analysis 
In the three years of FRS data used in this paper there were 26,229 pensioner units 
consisting of single people aged 60+ or couples where either partner was aged 60+, 
who would therefore be eligible for the pensioner rates of IS, CTB and HB.  The 
scope of the analysis in this paper was restricted, as follows, to a sub-sample of 
12,801 pensioner units: 
1.  Only those at least five years above state pension age (i.e. men aged 70+ and 
women aged 65+) were used in the analysis.  10,339 younger pensioner units were 
excluded.
2.  Those who had any income from employment or self-employment were 
excluded, reducing the sample by a further 525. 
3.  The sample was restricted to households containing a single pensioner aged 
65/70+ or a couple where both partners were five or more years above state pension 
age were included.  The presence of other household members considerably 
complicates the calculation of entitlements and increases the scope for measurement 
error.  This restriction excluded another 2,140 pensioner units.
4.  Households who were still re-paying a mortgage were excluded, reducing the 
sample b a further 413.  Mortgage repayments exist for only a small minority of the 
age group of interest but affect the calculation of IS entitlement and are a potential 
source of measurement error.  
5.  Eleven cases who were in receipt of allowances from a spouse not in the 
household were also excluded. 
An additional 3,352 cases were not included in the analysis due to data deficiencies: 
 1,330 for whom details on capital holdings were missing and entitlement to 
benefits could not be assessed 
 1,502 for whom other missing/ inconsistent data prevented entitlements being 
calculated reliably 
 520 who were receiving one or more benefit to which they were calculated to be 
not entitled. 17
Table A1: Weekly rates of principal social security benefits applicable to 
pensioners in the 1997-8, 1998-9 and 1999-2000 FRS 
£s per week 
 From 
April:
   1997  1998  1999 
Basic state pension  Full rate  62.45  64.70  66.75 
  ‘Married woman’s’ rate  37.35  38.70  39.35 
Age addition to state pension, 
payable from age 80 
 0.25  0.25  0.25 
Attendance Allowance  Higher rate  49.50  51.30  52.95 
 Lower  rate  33.10  34.30  35.40 
Disability Living Allowance – 
care component 
Highest rate  49.50  51.30  52.95 
 Middle  rate  33.10  34.30  35.40 
 Lowest  rate  13.15  13.60  14.05 
Disability Living Allowance – 
mobility component 
Higher rate  34.60  35.85  37.00 
 Lower  rate  13.15  13.60  14.05 
IS/HB/CTB for pensioners  single pensioner aged under 75  68.80  70.45  75.00 
  single pensioner aged 75-79  71.00  72.65  77.30 
  single pensioner aged 80+  75.70  77.55  82.25 
  single pensioner with severe 
disability premium 
112.85 116.05 122.00
  couples, both partners aged under 
75
106.80 109.35 116.60
  couples, older partner aged 75-79  109.90  112.55  119.85
  couples, older partner aged 80+  115.15  117.90  125.30
  couples, older partner aged 75-79, 
one partner qualifying for a carer 
premium 
123.25 126.20 133.80
  couples, older partner aged 80+, 
qualifying for a carer premium  
128.50 131.55 139.25
  couples, both qualifying for the 
severe disability premium 
189.45 194.90 204.80
 lower  capital  threshold  3,000  3,000  3,000 
  upper capital threshold - IS  8,000  8,000  8,000 
  upper capital threshold – HB/CTB  16,000  16,000  16,000
Notes:
(1) It is not possible to receive both Attendance Allowance and the care component of 
Disability Living Allowance.  Disability Allowance (care and mobility component) is payable 
to people aged 65+ only if they started to receive it before reaching 65. 
(2) The categories shown for Income Support are the main ones found in the FRS.   18
Figure 2   Distribution of percentages by which after housing costs income would rise if take-up were complete, by whether claiming some or 
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